

СВИФТ и кибербезопасность Текущий статус SWIFT and Cybersecurity An update

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Agenda





- Evolution of cyber-threats to the global banking community
- SWIFT's anti-fraud tools focus on Payment Controls & Daily Validation Reports



Customer Security Programme - February 2018



Customer Security Programme Brief update



CSP update | 2017 milestones





CSP update | Attestation

89% of customers attested their level of compliance with the mandatory controls by the 31 December 2017 deadline

This was an overwhelmingly positive response from the community – across every segment, market and infrastructure type.

All customers now need to self-attest that they fully comply with all mandatory security controls by 31 December 2018.

Self-attestations need to be renewed every 12 months.



89% BICs globally that selfattested by the deadline

99% of the FIN Traffic



Customer Security Programme - February 2018



CSP update | 2018 deliverables







CSP update | Consumption

Users should consume counterparty attestation data and integrate this into their risk management and business decision-making processes.

Using the KYC-SA, customers can share their attestation data with their counterparties and request data from others.

Customers remain in control of their attestation data – they can grant or deny requests of their attestation data.





Actions customers can take



Customer Security Programme - February 2018



CSP Update | What you can continue to do









The Evolving Cyber Threat To the Banking Community





Background

The February 2016 attack was a watershed moment for the payments industry. Though not
 the first case of fraud against a bank's payment endpoint, it was the scale and sophistication of the attack which shook the global community

The attackers not only had a detailed knowledge of the business processes involved in interbank payment messaging, but also reverse-engineered the specific interface software running at the victim bank

With this knowledge they built custom malware both to aid sending fraudulent messagesand to cover-up the evidence to enable their getaway. This was highly coordinated and took advantage of a local public holiday

Other cases occurred as other attackers ramped up copy-cat attacks

Software updates were released to mitigate specific attack vectors, e.g. improved database
 integrity checks, but the attackers continued their reverse-engineering efforts and updated their malware too

In all cases, security weaknesses in the victim banks led to the attackers' gaining
Administrator access. With this they could monitor the banks' operations, modify victims' security defences, update firewall rules, and bypass security features

Evolving Attack Techniques

- Protection
- Stealthiness
- Wipe-Out Techniques
- Highjacking
- Surveillance
- False-Flags
- Anonymity
- Watering Holes
- Exploits

Attackers protect their malware from being analysed and their secrets revealed

Attackers use fileless modules that were loaded into memory from the registry

- Attackers sometimes rely on commercial protector products Enigma and VMProtect
- Protection is notoriously difficult to break

with other legitimate system files

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Attackers employ anti-forensic techniques to erase traces of their own activity making retracing and understanding their actions difficult

When files are written to the hard drive, they are encrypted and camouflaged to blend

- Subsequent investigators may not find any digital fingerprints
- Attackers hijack legitimate software to manipulate its logic or monitor in-transit data
 One malicious module was re-programmed to always return "success" result, even if the software attempted to throw an alert
- Attackers deploy malicious modules that takes screen shots and records keystrokes
 Screenshots were encoded into a video format, allowing the attackers to 'watch' and understand the business processes. This surveillance can take many months
- Attacker place 'false-flags' in their malware, depicting (fictitious) tell-tale signs and patterns, e.g. false language codes or incorrectly transliterated words
 False flags are an attempt to put investigators off the tracks
- False-flags are an attempt to put investigators off the tracks
- Attackers set up a number proxy hops between themselves and the end-target
- This long chain of events is difficult for investigators to understand and trace. If the number of such proxy hops is > 3, it is very difficult to establish the real attacker
- In order to target victims, the attackers may not want to engage with them directly
- Attackers 'bait' a legitimate web site and patiently wait for the victim to visit
- If the visitor is of interest, then they attempt to infect the victim's machine
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- Attackers search for 'holes' in systems. Once found, they penetrate and compromise nodes, one after another
- Attackers only needs to find one hole, but the defender needs to fix all holes

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Basic Defences and Counter-Measures

- Secure your Environment
 Know and Limit Access
 Detect and Respond
 Threat Intelligence
 Limit Exposures
 Security Controls
- Know Your Counterparties
- Other Business Controls
- Incident Response

- Deploy a layered security architecture, across physical and logical
- Prevent and detect, segregate and isolate
- use Anti Virus tools and keep all software up to date
- Limit and protect administrator and system privileges
- Employ strong ID management with roles, profiles and password rules
- Use multifactor authentication
- Deploy intrusion detection capabilities, with triggers and tripwires
- Monitor alerts for suspicious activity
- Monitor unusual behaviour, e.g. out of hours, new systems, multiple failed passwords
- Know your adversary
- Share and consume information
- Act on recommendations
- Only do business with trusted counterparties
- Actively maintain your RMA relationships
- Remove non-current relationships
- Implement the security controls
- Complete self-attestation by end Dec 17
- Ensure compliance with all mandatory controls by Dec 18
- From Jan 18, request your counterparty's self-attestation against the security controls
- Assess their risk, based on the KYC-SA profile
- Put in place relevant controls calibrated to the perceived cyber-risk
- Screen your outgoing payments to detect illicit or unusual message flows
- Take immediate remedial action for out-of-policy messages
- Reconcile against confirmation and statement messages
- Institute and practice response and recovery it raises the chances of funds recovery
- Know how to send a cancellation message, if you suspect fraud
- Know what to do with a cancellation message, if you receive one





CSP & Transaction Pattern Detection

Daily Validation ReportsPayment Controls Service

Daily Validation Reports – responding to the insider threat



Attackers are organised, sophisticated and well funded

➔ In the event of an attack, accuracy of data in interface systems may be compromised

Banks need to verify the integrity of payments across *back-office* and interface systems

Daily Validation Reports - provide a way to access SWIFT's record of transaction activity to mitigate this insider threat and not having to rely on, possibly compromised, interface systems.



SWIFT

Daily Validation Reports

Activity Reporting – reports aggregate daily activity by message type, currency, country and counterparties with daily volume and value totals, maximum value of single transactions and comparisons to daily volume and value averages

Risk Reporting - highlights large or unusual message flows based on ordered lists for largest single transactions and largest aggregate transactions for counterparties, and a report on new combinations of counterparties to identify new relationships



Daily Validation Reports



New Counterparties Reporting -

highlights any new combinations of direct and indirect counterparties. Makes it easy to identify new payment relationships that may be indicative of risk, and helps you quickly understand the values and volumes of the transactions involved

How Daily Validation Reports can help identify fraud – A fictitious scenario



Fraud Prevention Roadmap | A complete fraud prevention solution

In your strategy to protect yourself against cyber-threat:

- Do you report on your activity on a daily basis? -
 - Have you defined a risk policy/ a payments policy Are you confident that your reporting is not compromised? Can you ensure their enforcement? _
 - Do you look back in time to understand normality of activity? _



Roadmap

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Identify in real time non compliant payments?

swiServices as safeguards to help address, as part of other controls, the mandatory Logging and Monitoring requirements (section 6.4) and the Transaction Business Control requirements (section 2.9)

Payment Controls | Capabilities



Key CSP deliverable that:

- Protects outbound payments of smaller banks
- Reduces *inbound risk* for larger correspondents

Q3 2018

Secure in-network, real-time monitoring:

- Independent of back-office
- Zero footprint (secure token access)
- Blocking and non-blocking modes (SSS model)
- Customer sets and controls monitoring policy
- Standard alert review workflows / escalation paths
- Baseline ruleset developed with our community
- Full audit trail for monitoring policy management and alert investigation
- MT101, MT103(+), MT202(COV) and MT205(COV)*

*Additional message types, including MX, are under consideration



Payment Controls | Capabilities

Flexible parameters including:

- 1. Business hours and days
- 2. Currency whitelist / blacklists, single & aggregate payment limits
- Country whitelist / blacklists, single & aggregate payment limits
- 4. Country & currency threshold combinations
- 5. Single & group institution limits
- 6. New payment flows
- 7. Suspicious accounts
- 8. Uncharacteristic behaviours

Across the complete payment chain





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